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Abstract: Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper 
dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five 
interrelated claims. 1. There are no empirically-observable duties of EU citizenship; 2. 
Such duties would lack any legal-theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; 3. 
Legal-theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the 
Member State level; 4. EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of 
the Member States where residual duties remain, to enforce them; 5. This 
development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de-
dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are 
correct, it is time to stop categorizing EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of 
EU law. 
                                                        
*
 Many thanks to J.H.H.Weiler, who first made me think about citizenship duties seriously. The paper 
benefited from the comments of a number of academics. In particular, I would like to thank Daniel 
Augenstein, Carlos Closa Montero, Gareth Davies, Laurence W. Gormley, Dora Kostakopoulou, 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Giacopo Martire and Suryapratim Roy.  




I. Introduction and structure 
This paper critically engages with the concept of EU citizenship duties, looking at the 
evolution of the substance and content of such duties, as well as their theoretical 
essence.
1
 Besides being once mentioned in the Treaty,
2
 the duties of EU citizenship 
are frequently invoked in the scholarly literature as a sign of immaturity of EU 
citizenship.
3
 In the face of a strong presumption in favour of such duties, their 
scholarly assessment is long overdue.
4
 If the lack of clarity concerning duties really 
harms EU citizenship as numerous scholars claim, it is imperative to scrutinize the 
essence of such duties, the actual role they play, and their likely contribution to the 
achievement of the goals of the Union. Alternatively, should such duties be yet 
another myth in a long row of legal notions glorified in EU law, while, in reality, 
                                                        
1
 On EU citizenship see, e.g., Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘The Cherry Blossoms and the Moon of European 
Citizenship’, 62 ICLQ, 2013, 97; Shaw, Jo, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of 
Integration and Constitutionalism’, in Craig, Paul and de Búrca, Gráinne (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law, 2
nd
 ed., OUP, 2011, 575; Wollenschläger, Ferdinand, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond 
Market Integration’, 17 ELJ, 2011, 1; Kostakopoulou, Dora, ‘European Union Citizenship: Wiritng the 
Future’, 13 ELJ, 2007, 623. 
2
 Art. 20(2) TFEU. 
3
 Weiler, J.H.H., ‘Europa: “Nous coalisons des Etats, nous n’unissons pas des hommes”’, in Cartabia, 
Marta and Simoncini, Andrea (eds.), La sostenibilità della democrazia nel XXI secolo, Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2009, 51, 59 et seq.; Condonazzi, Massimo et al., Citizenship of the Union and Free Movement 
of Persons, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, 19; Davis, Roy, ‘Citizenship of the Union… Rights 
for All?’, 27 ELRev., 2002, 121; Neuwahl, Nanette, ‘The Place of the Citizen in the European 
Construction’, in Lynch, Philip et al. (eds.), Reforming the European Union – from Maastricht to 
Amsterdam, London: Longman, 2000, 191, 193; Shaw, Jo, ‘Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-
National Membership?’, 6 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, 1998, 343–344; 
Streek, Wolfgang, ‘Citizenship under Regime Competition’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No.09, 1997.  
4
 What is meant by duties here, are the duties in the person of the citizen, not the duties of the 
authorities vis-à-vis the citizen. 
 4 







 this should be put straight: the presumption of importance of EU citizenship 
duties should be dismissed once and for all. To do this is the core ambition of this 
paper.  
Unlike a myriad scholars claiming that, to quote J.H.H. Weiler, ‘la cultura 
dei diritti, che lo si voglia o no, indebolisce alquanto la contro-cultura della 
reponsabilità e del dovere’8 this article demonstrates that duties of EU citizenship only 
exist as one word in the Treaty, which does not happen to correspond to anything in 
either contemporary legal theory or in practice: both theory and day-to-day reality 
mandate a conclusion that there is simply no ‘contro-cultura’ which is at the centre of 
the regrets, expressed in current mainstream scholarship, which is most likely 
mistaken.
9
 Moreover, the fact that there is no such ‘contro-cultura’ is a good thing, 
unlike what all the scholars listed in footnote three and their numerous associates 
claim.  
Crucially, this situation is not specific to EU citizenship and boasts multiple 
parallels at the Member State level, where duties have been in marked recess during 
the last half a century at least. Speaking of citizenship duties,
10
 scholars fail to take 
                                                        
5
 De Búrca, Gráinne, Kochenov, Dimitry and Williams, Andrew (eds.), Europe’s Justice Deficit?, Hart 
Publishing, 2014 (forthcoming); Williams, Andrew, The Ethos of Europe, Cambridge: CUP, 2010. 
6
 Weiler (2009) ‘Europa’, 51. 
7
 Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘Citizenship without Respect’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 8/2010; de 
Búrca, Gráinne, ‘The Role of Equality in European Community Law’, in Dashwood, Alan and 
O’Leary, Síofra (eds.), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997, 13. 
8
 Weiler (2009) ‘Europa’, 80. For more criticism of rights: Tushnet, Mark, ‘An Essay on Rights’, 62 
Texas L.Rev., 1984, 1363. 
9
 Also, Joppke, Christian, ‘The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship’, 51 Eur. J. Sociology, 2010, 37. 
For a sound glimpse of the future see also Kostakopoulou, Dora, The Future Governance of 
Citizenship, Cambridge: CUP, 2008. 
10
 It is necessary to distinguish the legal concept from ‘industrial’, ‘ecological’, ‘social’ and other 
‘citizenships’, not essentially connected to possessing a nationality regulated by law: Maillard, 
 5 
into account the core function of ‘classical’ citizenship duties,11 which consisted in the 
uniformisation of societies through punishing difference, as well as in the preservation 
of the status quo through providing a justification for sex and race discrimination, 
thus crushing individuality and silencing dissent. Once such ends have been made 
unacceptable with the rise of tolerance, inclusion, and respect, the tool for achieving 
them – duties – logically fell out of use in the citizenship context. EU Member States 
falling outwith the general de-dutification trend, such as Greece or Estonia with their 
conscription laws, or Belgium with its obligatory participation in elections, are now 
the odd ones out, providing exceptions to the mainstream picture, rather than 
reaffirming the main rule. This bears on the essence of citizenship as such: liberated 
from the ties of duties, it became less totalitarian, less intrusive and more inclusive. 
The argument is structured as follows. The paper starts with the analysis of 
the socio-legal reality of EU citizenship to discover that no obvious EU citizenship 
duties are observable. A glance at the law of the Member States reveals that the 
situation in national law is largely similar: the lists of duties are getting shorter and 
shorter, being driven by identical socio-legal processes (II.). The argument then 
moves to theory, addressing – and dismissing – a variety of legal-theoretical 
explanations of the importance of the concept of citizenship duties.
12
 The paper 
underlines that the popular tandem of duties-rights – ‘the greater the liberty, the more 
                                                                                                                                                               
Sandrine, L’émergence de la citoyenneté sociale européenne, Aix-en-Prevence : Presses Universitaires 
d’Aix-Marseille, 2008; Mundlak, Guy, ‘Industrial Citizenship, Social Citizenship, Corporate 
Citizenship: I Just Want My Wages’, 8 Theoretical Inquiries L., 2007, 719. For an example of 
confusion: e.g. Streek (1997). 
11
 See, e.g. parts of Mazzini, Giuseppe, ‘Dei doveri dell’uomo’, in Opere politiche (2nd ed.), Torino: 
UTET, 2005, 851. 
12
 E.g. Simmons, John, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. 
 6 
the duty’13 – cannot be simply assumed: legal theory moved on.14 Scholars attempting 
to import this orthodoxy into EU citizenship field failed to seriously scrutinize this 
untenable assumption.
15
 Given the overwhelming consensus among scholars that even 
the would-be duty to obey the law – often presented as the core of citizenship – as 
such is deprived of any ethical foundation,
16
 it becomes clear that the story of 
citizenship duties, is not alone, let alone exceptional: all duties-oriented thinking 
might be in decline
17
 in contemporary rights-based secular legal culture.
18
 While it is 
undeniable that codes of conduct can be equally successful, either based on rights, or 
duties,
19
 there is a reason behind opting for rights as the starting point. Any system 
                                                        
13
 Lieber, Francis, Manual of Political Ethics, (first published in 1838, 2
nd
 rev. ed. by Theodore W. 
Woolsey, 1911), 383–384. Persuasive critique of this simplistic view appeared in legal-theoretical 
literature long ago: Hohfield, Wesley, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, New Haven: Yale UP, 1920. 
14
 For criticism: Hart, H.L.A., ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, 64 Philosophical Rev., 1955, 175; 
Feinberg, Joel, ‘Duties, Rights, and Claims’, 3 American Philosophical Quarterly, 1966, 137; 
Williams, Granville, ‘The Concept of Legal Liberty’, 56 Columbia L.Rev., 1956, 1729, 1750. 
15
 E.g. Davis (2002), 123. 
16
 E.g. Raz, Joseph, ‘Authority and Consent’, 67 Virginia L.Rev., 1981, 103; Lyons, David, ‘Need, 
Necessity, and Political Obligation’, 67 Virginia L.Rev., 1981, 77; Simmons, John, ‘Moral Principles 
and Political Obligations’, 67 Virginia L.Rev., 1981; Wasserstrom, R.A., ‘The Obligation to Obey the 
Law’, in Summers, R.S. (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: OUP, 1979, 233; Raz, Joseph, The 
Authority of the Law, Oxford: OUP, 1979, 233; Smith, M.B.E., ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to 
Obey the Law?’, 82 Yale L.J., 1973, 950. 
17
 This is acknowledged by critics: See Weiler’s unpublished paper ‘On the Distinction between Values 
and Virtues in the Process of European Integration’; Kuisma, Mikko, ‘Rights of Privileges? The 
Challenge of Globalisation to the Values of Citizenship’, 12 Citizenship Stud., 2008, 613. 
18
 So the classical Canon Law was built on the ideology of duties and the Papal plenitudo potestatis, 
leading the State theorists of the Papal States to deny ‘the very principle of a constitutional government 
as an objectionable heresy’: Van Caeneghem, R.C., ‘Constitutional History: Chance or Grand 
Design?’, 5 EuConst, 2009, 447, 457. Obligation is key to Jewish law too: Cover, Robert, ‘Obligation: 
A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order’, 5 J.L. & Religion, 1987, 65. The consequences of the 
obligation-oriented pre-secular world-view are profoundly felt today: Anscombe, G.E.M., ‘Modern 
Moral Philosophy’, 33 Philosophy, 1958, 6. 
19
 Hart (1955), 176; also Perry, Michael, ‘Taking Neither the Rights-Talk Nor the “Critique of Rights” 
Too Seriously’, 62 Texas L.Rev., 1984, 1405. 
 7 
based on duties necessarily implies a strong predetermined set of prescriptions of 
good and bad and right and wrong. To agree with H.L.A. Hart, ‘those who lived by 
such systems could not of course be committed to the recognition of the equal right to 
be free’:20 the reason why duties-based systems are observable in the context of faith-
inspired law of numerous democracies, or the ethos of control professed by 
totalitarian states (III.). The last part will show that EU law has strong potential to 
undermine the enforceability of the Member State-level duties of citizenship, thus 
indirectly promoting the supranational understanding of duties and thereby assisting 
their decline in all the Member States (IV.). 
The conclusion restates the main findings: 1. There are no empirically-
observable duties of EU citizenship; 2. Such duties would lack any legal-theoretical 
foundation, even should the contrary be true; 3. This situation is in no way different 
from the Member State level; 4. EU law plays an important role in undermining the 
ability of the Member States where residual duties remain, to enforce them; 5. This 
development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the 
rule of law, and human rights in the Member States. If my conclusions are correct, it 
is time to stop categorizing EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law, 
since it is clear that they are not necessary and, moreover, antithetical, to the goals of 




                                                        
20
 Hart (1955), 176, 177. 
21
 See in the same vein Kadelbach, Stefan, ‘Union Citizenship’, in von Bogdandy, Armin and Bast, 
Jürgen (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford: Hart, 2006, 453, at 484. 
 8 
 
II.  The practice explained 
Citizenship duties cannot be simply implied from rights.
22
 Indeed, ‘if the law lays 
down no duty, it is generally indicated in legal works by making no reference to the 
subject’.23 In other words, duties are necessarily explicit in the law. While the fact that 
‘there is no entry of “breakfast, liberty to eat”, in the index to Corpus Juris’24 does not 
indicate that there is no such right, the fact that the Treaty does not require the 
citizens, for instance, ‘to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of 
inquiry and reform’ – like the Indian Constitution does25 – is a clear indication that 
there is no such citizenship duty in EU law. It is crucial to see which duties are set out 
in the law in order to understand the role they play in the legal system. While the 
existence of the duties named in the legal documents can be empirically checked, 
unnamed legal duties most likely do not exist.
26
 
                                                        
22
 See Part III, infra. 
23




 Art. 51A(h) of the Consitution of India. For a remarkably uninspiring (although official) analysis of 
this duty see Irani, C.R. and Lall, K.B. (on behalf of the National Commission to Review the Working 
of the Constitution), Effectuation of Fundamental Duties of Citizens, New Delhi, 2011. 
26
 The most presumed citizenship duty in the context of EU law seems to be the unwritten duty to move 
or otherwise fall within the scope of EU law in order to benefit in full from all the rights provided by 
the Union legal system. Rather than an unwritten citizenship duty, however, the current reality where 
EU citizenship needs at times to be activated by the use of rights provided by the EU level is an 
anomaly related to the legal-historical approach to drawing the vertical boundary between the two legal 
orders in the EU, rather than a duty of citizenship. Viewed as such, it is more comparable to being 
present in the territory of the state in order to be protected by its police force. It is impossible to claim 
that a Dutchmen in Angola has a duty to move to Amsterdam in order to be protected by the Dutch 
police. The trouble with the EU is that the jurisdictional boundary is frequently most unclear: nobody 
knows where Angola ends and Amsterdam begins, which often means that it is impossible to say who 
is and who is not to enjoy EU-level rights among EU citizens in each given situation: both the national 
and the EU legal orders are to blame, to which all the controversial case-law surrounding Art. 51 of the 
Charter testifies. If an argument that reverse discrimination amounts to noxal liability is made, it should 
thus be very carefully dissected. For analyses of collective responsibility and the blurred nature of the 
 9 
It is not enough to demonstrate the absence of duties as such, however. An 
explanation of the reasons behind such absence is due, particularly given the 
prominent role that duties of all sorts have played in the past, from loving your King 
and not thinking bad things about him, or dying for him, to upholding the jus primae 
noctis famously contextualized by Mozart in Le nozze di Figaro. 
 It is suggested that the liberation from duties-oriented thinking – rather than 
attempting to connect citizenship with duties – is what corresponds to the creation of a 
responsible citizenship based on respect. This is due chiefly to two considerations, 
valid both at the EU and national levels. Firstly, duties became unnecessary since they 
enjoyed a function of justifying largely arbitrary exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from the benefits of the status. Secondly, citizenship duties became unnecessary since 
their other function was the uniformisation of society, through the stigmatization of 
difference. Both are not acceptable aims any more. Consequently, with thick 
allegiances and identities receding at the national level too, the EU cannot be expected 
to be different. Moreover, given that the promotion of exclusion and the 
stigmatization of difference are straightforwardly antithetical to the objectives which 
the Union is set to achieve, there is no possible place for citizenship duties in EU law. 
EU citizenship has matured greatly in the last two decades, shaping the legal 
situation of all Europeans and directly affecting national citizenship law and policy.
27
 
The fact that such a rise in de jure as well as de facto legal importance was not 
accompanied by any observable transfer of allegiance to the supranational level, or 
replication of all what is repugnant in state-mandated nationalist ideologies, is 
                                                                                                                                                               
vertical jurisdictional boundary in the EU see, respectively, e.g. Miceli, Thomas J., ‘Collective 
Responsibility’, in Dari-Mattacci, Giuseppe (ed.), Roman Law and Economics (forthcoming) and 
Kochenov (2010) ‘Citizenship without respect’. I thank Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Suryapratim Roy for 
bringing this issue to my attention. 
27
 Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘Rounding up the Circle’, RSCAS Working Paper No. 23/2010. 
 10 
probably EU citizenship’s strongest and most appealing side: the Sonderweg of 
European law.
28
 Dispensing of parochialism of paternalistic patriotic mythologies, 
while crafting a sound legally-consequential status, potentially solves plenty of ugly 
issues left open by national citizenship. In such a context the initial dilemma 
undermining any national ideology does not even arise, namely, how can a system be 
based on the considerations which are obviously not true?
29
 The implied idea of 
superiority – cultural, linguistic, moral, or otherwise vis-à-vis the ‘other’ – which 
seems to be a necessary component of national citizenships – is not necessary at the 
supranational level.  
Thick identities are indispensable for the crafting of citizenship duties, but not 
for protecting rights. EU citizens have a number of important rights, many of which 
are listed in Part II TFEU.
30
 These include non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality as well as other types of non-discrimination, some political rights, free-
movement rights within the territory of the Internal Market, entitlements to their 
human rights protection in the situations falling within the scope of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union
31
 as well as, equally importantly, 
                                                        
28
 Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L.J., 1991, 2403; Weiler, J.H.H., ‘In 
Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’, in Weiler, J.H.H. and Wind, Marlene 
(eds.), European Constitutionalism beyond the State, Cambridge: CUP, 2003, 7. See also 
Kostakopoulou, Dora, ‘Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the EU: Bringing Forth the 
Complexity’, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L., 1999, 389; Palombella, Gianluigi, ‘Whose Europe? After the 
Constitution’, 3 I-CON, 2005, 357. Also in this vein see Kostakopoulou, Dora, ‘Citizenship Goes 
Public: The Institutional Design of Anational Citizenship’, 17 J. Pol. Philosophy, 2009, 275. 
29
 Miller, David, ‘The Ethical Significance of Nationality’, 98 Ethics, 1988, 657, 658. 
30
 For the analysis of specific rights see e.g. Wollenschläger (2011); Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘Ius Tractum 
of Many Faces: European Citizenship and a Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’, 15 
CJEL, 2009, 169.  
31
 Knook, Allard, ‘The Court, the Charter, and the Vertical Division of Powers in the European Union’, 
42 CMLRev., 2005, 367.  
 11 
unwritten rights of citizenship formulated in the Court’s case-law,32 which are rooted 
in the nature of the idea of citizenship and reshape the vertical division of powers in 
the Union.
33
 A right not to be forced to leave the territory of the Union
34
 (but, 
ironically, not of your Member State of nationality
35
) and the right to additional 
procedural guarantees stemming from Union law in the cases when the very status of 
citizenship is at stake,
36
 provide two most appropriate examples of such unwritten 
rights. In the light of these examples it is clear that more such unwritten rights can 
come to be discovered by the Court.
37
 
 With the duties the picture is drastically different: the Treaty does not in fact 
mention a single one. Scholars trying to find any are bound to concede that implied 
unwritten legal duties are hardly enforceable and, most likely, would be a bad idea. 
We are told that the Union does not command enough allegiance to impose duties,
38
 
which is viewed as a problem, as if the imposition of duties, as such, were a sign of 
meaningful citizenship. This doctrinalism full of regrets is rooted in the mistaken 
assumption that rights without duties are impossible. Instead of critically engaging 
with the notion of EU citizenship duties, scholars soothe their readers that the absence 
                                                        
32
 Kochenov, Dimitry and Plender, Richard, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient 
Substance?’, 37 ELRev., 2012, 369. The scope of such rights is, expectedly, unclear: Kochenov, 
Dimitry, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Justification’, 19 ELJ, 2013, 502. 
33
 Lenaerts, Koen, ‘“Civis europaeus sum”: From the Cross-Border Link to the Status of Citizen of the 
Union’, 3 JFMW, 2011, 6;  Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘A Real European Citizenship’, 18 CJEL, 2011, 55. 
34
 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177. 
35
 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375. 
36
 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449. 
37
 Through such rights EU citizenship is potentially capable of supplying the EU with an alternative 
paradigm of integration, to compete with the Internal Market: Kochenov, Dimitry, ‘The Citizenship 
Paradigm’, CYELS, 2012-2013 (forthcoming). 
38
 Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, Shaw, J. and More, G. (ed.), New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 73. 
 12 
of duties is a soluble problem and the duties will come,
39
 even listing some examples, 
such as ‘the duty to obey the law; the duty to participate in the defence of one’s polity; 
the duty to pay tax; the duty to seek employment; and a duty to vote’.40 In other 
words, among the numerous duties offered as likely entrants on the stage of EU law, 
the majority are confused misrepresentations of the idea. Such duties as to pay taxes, 
or abide by the law are of general application concerning all, no matter citizens or not, 
and can thus hardly be branded as citizenship duties. A duty to work or otherwise 
contribute to society cannot be proclaimed without cynicism when unemployment 
rates in some Member States reach 20% or more and when sad examples are at hand 
where the enforcement of such duties drove Nobel Prize winning poets to a Siberian 
exile.
41
 And the duty to be proud of the Union and respect its values largely comes 
down to mongering thick allegiances which – besides an obvious point that one 
cannot be ordered to love and be passionate out of a rulers’ volition – also threatens 
all what the Union has achieved to date, in terms of liberation from indoctrination 
which reins at the national level: an attempted move, in Allott’s words, from 
“diplomacy” to “democracy”.42 In short, EU citizenship duties do not exist. Moreover, 
it is not a problem at all. Rather, it is an asset for the Union legal system, which is 
much less unique, however, than it might seem. 
The lack of duties at EU level reflects a general evolution of the relationship 
between the governing and the governed, which develops in a similar vein also at the 
Member State level. It is characteristic of all democracies around the world and falls 
                                                        
39
 Shaw (1998), 343–344. 
40
 Davis (2002), 123. See also Shaw (1998), 245. 
41
 Nikolaj Jakimchuk, Delo Iosifa Brodskogo: Kak sudili poèta, St. Petersburg: Severnaja zvezda, 2005 
(Joseph Brodsky was sentenced to Siberian exile as an idle layabout since his poetry was not good 
enough in the eyes of the State: Soviet law contained a citizenship duty to work). 
42
 Allott, Philip, ‘The European Community is not the True European Community’, 100 Yale L.J., 
1991, 2485. 
 13 
within the general trend of moving ‘away from ascribed statuses in all […] areas’.43 
Although citizenship duties have always lingered in the background of the republican 
citizenship theory’s pairing of rights and duties, they never received much attention in 
the literature, becoming a ‘theoretical stepchild’44 of citizenship theory. Even in the 
common language ‘duties’ and ‘citizenship’ parted ways long ago. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines ‘citizenship’ as ‘the position or status of being a citizen 
with its rights and privileges’.45 This fully reflects classical sociological works on 
citizenship, which do not speak of citizenship duties in any sense, which would be 
close to legal. The key account by T.H. Marshall, for instance, clarifies that 
citizenship duties mean that ‘[citizen’s] acts should be inspired by a lively sense of 
responsibility towards the welfare of the community’.46 This is not a surprise, in the 
context of such a definition that compulsory duties enjoyed much lesser importance 
for Marshall and other theorists than voluntary obligations vis-à-vis neighbours and 
compatriots. Marshall outlined the following citizens’ duties: paying taxes, educating 
one’s family, military service, and promoting the welfare of the community.47 All of 
these either do not exist anymore at all, or are hardly related to the legal status of 
citizenship in the contemporary context.  
The ideology of duties accompanying historical accounts of citizenship is 
feudal in nature. The feudal world-order put at its centre the allegiance to the Lord, 
directly reflected in the duty of obedience. Through the doctrine of perpetual 
allegiance feudalism entered the republican citizenship world. The key reasoning 
                                                        
43
 Shachar, Ayelet, The Birthright Lottery: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, 9; For a 
general analysis of the maturation of this trend see e.g. Kostakopoulou (2007), chapter 1. 
44
 Janoski, Thomas, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, 
Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes, Cambridge: CUP, 1998, 219. 
45
 Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: OUP, 2012. 
46
 Marshall, T.H., Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1977, 9. 
47
 Marshall, T.H., Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: CUP, 1950. 
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dates back to 1608, when Lord Coke in the famous Calvin case, established the duty 
of perpetual allegiance: ‘the reason hereof [being the fact that] the law of God and 
nature is one to all. By this law of nature is the faith, ligeance, and obedience of the 
subject due to his Sovereign or superior’.48 Simply by being born you would instantly 
owe a lot to the local Lord – the King of the land.49 The promotion of the ideology of 
the citoyen did not fundamentally alter this state of affairs, since only the hypothetical 
beneficiary to whom the duties are owed changed – a feudal overlord came to be 
replaced with a ‘great’ nation. The context of allegiance – no matter whether to a 
nation or to a King – is entirely random and is deprived even of the vaguest 
semblance of choice. Mythologies of national exceptionalism and greatness are called 
in to justify the lack of such choice. Given their general ethical weakness, however, 
coupled with the rise in liberalism, tolerance and equality, such mythologies are 
powerless to back duties effectively, leading to the global recess of the latter. Unlike 
in a feudal polity, a modern state ‘must justify [its] demands to the anarchist, the 
skeptic and the honest enquirer’.50 
 A study of the history of citizenship reveals that it has undergone a drastic 
evolution through time. Roughly speaking, we witnessed a move from an extremely 
exclusionary republican status based on particular sex, race, wealth and other 
characteristics,
51
 to the actual inclusive membership of the community. Although 
contemporary citizenship is struggling to become inclusive and to operate a notion of 
who the citizens are, which would drastically depart from the exclusionary patterns of 
the past, large numbers of de facto stateless people all around demonstrates quite 
                                                        
48
 Calvin (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.), 392. 
49
 Compare: Rembaum, Joel, ‘Medieval Jewish Criticism of the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin’, 7/8 
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clearly that we are only at the beginning of a long road. The direction of the 
contemporary evolution is quite clear, however. Once the nature of citizenship as a 
generally arbitrary engine of exclusion comes into light,
52
 excluding those who are not 
in possession of a formal legal status of citizenship from the benefits it has to offer 
ends up regarded as almost untenable. While numerous approaches to demarcating 
citizens and non-citizens exist,
53
 the line between those who are and those who are not 
formally citizens of the community is thinning very rapidly, just as the ethical 
foundations of exclusion.
54
 We are witnessing a total shift of the border between 
persons and citizens in Constitutional thought.
55
 
 In the context of the on-going transformation two important functions of 
citizenship duties come to light. Unlike the common perception among observers 
today, the main function of citizenship duties in the past was an exclusionary one: 
duties were relied upon to outline second-class citizens – such as persons of colour, 
women, the poor,
56
 the weak, and, crucially for the democratic outcomes, political 
dissenters – in order to justify their full exclusion from the actual benefits that the 
legal status of citizenship which they formally possessed was supposed to provide to 
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‘everyone’. 57  Indeed, especially women were ‘sharply, normatively, and 
unequivocally excluded from the citizen-soldier tradition’. 58  Duties reduced 
‘everyone’ – roughly the scope of de jure citizenship in an ideal polity,59 to the group 
of loyal and well-off white males of the right religion, thus in fact stripping 
citizenship – as a legal status of equals – of its core content, failing both individuals 
and groups.
60
 ‘Old enough to die – old enough to vote’ ideology, while helping racial 
minorities,
61
 did not work well for women, proclaimed unfit for the military and thus 
also unfit for jury duty and, also, key rights, such as voting.
62
 
When the benefits of citizenship depend on fulfilling the duties, the door is 
open for denying the essence of the status to those who either choose not to bother 
(hippies and vagabonds), behave contrary to what a particular interpretation of duties 
prescribes (Communists, disloyal by definition, just as flag-burners, polygamists etc.), 
or are simply announced as not good enough (women, too weak to be useful
63
). 
Plentiful examples of such developments are well-known and go back to the infamous 
US Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott, where Taney CJ argued that given that the 
service in the militia is clearly limited to a ‘free able-bodied white male citizen’, ‘the 
Aftican race’ is ‘repudiated, and rejected from the duties and obligations of 
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citizenship’.64 Crucially, upon this reading, where there are no duties, there are no 
rights and, consequently, no benefits citizenship – the possession of the formal legal 
status notwithstanding.  
 In fact, commonly invoked duties obstruct lives, rather than ‘creating 
citizens’.65 While the modern take on citizenship is chiefly related to the respect to 
each person’s individuality, necessarily involving possible assistance in the 
accomplishment of individual life projects, this was not the case in the past. “[I]n 
August 1914, Australians and Germans, Frenchmen and Englishmen, flooded the 
enlistment offices, but we would not want to explain their military enthusiasm by 
reference to the quality of their citizenship [but rather] as a sign of the poverty of their 
lives and their lack of moral independence.” 66  Duties of citizenship is the main 
vehicle to nourish and preserve such lack, it seems, which is particularly evident now, 
in the ‘age of post-heroic geopolitics’,67 where being slaughtered ‘for the nation’ is 
usually a sign of misery of one’s background, rather than heroism, unlike the German 
deaths at Stalingrad in 1943, American in Vietnam in 1972, or Russian in Budapest in 
1956: the times have changed. 
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Consequently, the second function of citizenship duties can be outlined, 
which is at least as important as the first and consists in the uniformisation of the 
population and the suppression and humiliation of any difference and dissent, 
deploying citizenship duties to get rid of diversity, cultural, political, linguistic, or 
otherwise, building on the presumption that the State knows better what the citizens 
should want and should strive to achieve, denying citizens personality, respect and 
choice. This function of citizenship has lost any ethical significance during the 
criminal 20
th
 century. It is impossible to have any doubts any more about a simple fact 
that the State does not know better.
68
 Virtually any (mind-) uniformisation projects 
should arouse skepticism at best, if not be automatically dismissed as abuse of power. 
 All the recent developments in the understanding of citizenship, as well as 
the ideals of equality and inherent human worth make the duties-thinking untenable, 
since the lines duties helped to draw represent precisely all the shameful corners of 
the citizenship tradition, logically and predictably removing duties from the pedestal.
 
69
 Engin Isin’s theory of acts of citizenship can be deployed to illustrate the 
importance of this line of developments from yet another perspective. Isin divides 
citizens into passive, active and activist.
70
 Roughly speaking, the passive do not 
bother, active are confined in their actions to what is permitted, supported, and 
pursued by the state: they fight wars for it, they are regulars at elections and are 
generally ‘good guys’. The activist citizens, to the contrary, are those who destabilize 
the regime: they defy the draft, laugh at the eventual duties of ‘good citizenship’ and, 
in the long run, define and reinvent the essence of the polity by fighting and 
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 Although they are usually punished and branded as unworthy citizens, 
clearly, they are the driving force of positive change. US founders, just as Monnet, 
Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer were all activist citizens, who had to overcome 
duties, rather than be meek and comply. 
 
III. Obedience and theory 
Citizenship plays an important role at both EU and national levels. This is mostly due 
to the concept of rights and is not disturbed by whatever is going on with the duties of 
citizenship. Consequently, approaching the matter empirically, there is no correlation 
between duties and citizenship. Moreover, given the emerging scholarly consensus 
that the moral duty to obey the law, including the hypothetical duties of citizenship, 
cannot be possibly justified, the moral worth of citizenship duties is nihil: compliance 
– just as non-compliance – with whatever the authority demands of you does not 
make you a worse or a better person in moral terms. In this context, there is simply no 
place for the glorification of diligently complacent citizens, let alone making the 
duties of citizenship the measure of the concept’s success, as numerous scholars 
seemed to suggest. Indeed, following Isin, ignoring the proclaimed duties can be just 
as worthy an act of citizenship as respecting them. 
To agree with Joppke, the reality itself ‘exposes as empty rhetoric the ritual 
notion that citizenship rests on a “balance of obligations and rights”’.72 Legal theorists 
tried to clean up the rights-duties correlation by separating liberties from rights
73
 (the 
former not corresponding to any possible obligation even in principle) and duties from 
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 (the latter correlative to rights, but voluntarily assumed).
75
 The fact 
remains, following H.L.A. Hart, that all these notions actually come from ‘different 
segments of morality, concern different conduct, and make different types of moral 
criticism and evaluation’.76 The correlation between rights and duties, blurring all 
these divides, is thus particularly unhelpful, especially given that rights, essentially, 
are not negative claims on others, as Waldron has shown.
77
 To establish that a right 




The misleading nature of duties and rights pairing has long being recognized 
in the literature.
79
 Feinberg provides a fine illustration: ‘we commonly enough hear 
talk of “owing obedience” to parents, police officers, and bosses, and these authorities 
speak readily enough of having a claim to our obedience. Does an authority then have 
a right to be obeyed by his inferiors?’80 The question of correlativity of duties and 
rights is very relevant also because of another consideration. Should we believe that 
they are indeed correlative, interesting questions of the order of precedence arise. Do I 
have a right because you have a duty, or do I have a duty because you have a right?
81
 
Upon such reading we would only have duties because authority has a right – which is 
highly problematic. Moreover, firm correlation also threatens to deprive both duties 
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and rights of any meaning, because of the risks of turning both into merely two 
different ways of describing the same phenomenon. Importantly, even if a right does 
not necessarily correspond to a duty, this does not imply that there are no 
responsibilities attached to the enjoyment of the right.
82
 In Feinberg’s words, ‘a 
responsibility, like a duty, is both a burden and a liability, but unlike a duty it carries 
considerable discretion’. 83  Such responsibilities, however, should be clearly 
distinguished from the duties of citizenship. 
The perceived correlation between rights and duties is so settled that 
scholars often use any pretext to uphold it, even if such attempts are obviously 
unhelpful, and even if the responsibilities attached to rights tend thereby to be either 
turned into duties proper, or dismissed outright. Uncritical approach is profoundly 
problematic in this context. The literature knows infinite examples where uncritical 
complacency and poverty of civility and personal autonomy, like in Walzer’s example 
of enlistment of citizens during First World War, instead of being criticized, are 
glorified as examples of the virtues of citizenship duties. All the blindly accepted 
‘theory’ of rights and duties implying the constant correlation between the two is in 
fact nothing more than an unconvincing justification of the repugnant roles the duties 
played, as discussed supra, which works against citizenship and, in particular, against 
the vital activist citizenship in Isin’s understanding. Unable to find duties mentioned 
in the law, scholars presuming that the duties should be there no matter what in order 
to justify the existence of ‘correlative’ rights, which are clearly observable, go to great 
lengths in inventing possible duties. This leads to particularly flawed texts. Janowitz, 
in one example, proposed a citizenship obligation of ‘participation in voluntary 
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associations including, especially, community based organisations’.84 It is regrettable, 
should one adopt this perspective, that lives are not lived for citizenship, instead, 
scholars are to be reminded that citizenship is there to facilitate personal projects and 
improve lives. 
In framing citizenship and rights opposing a citizen to a State is not enough, 
it seems: the landscape of our interactions is much more complex, involving a strong 
social element which does not overlap with what the state offers.
85
 There is no reason 
it seems, to equate citizenship with all the social aspects of our lives, since a society 
as such cannot possibly be based on state-supplied blessings and confirmations of 
someone’s legal status. To the contrary, a society is a social fact – it exists and is 
observable in crude reality and necessarily involves citizens and non-citizens alike.
86
 
Speaking about societal obligations in the language of citizenship duties is misleading 
and should not be done, just as forging obligations out of voluntary activities, which is 
outright absurd. 
The fact that citizenship duties are not necessarily correlated to rights in 
theory is in direct relation with the general lack of moral foundations that would 
require obedience to the law. Moral duties as such have very difficult time in 
contemporary legal theory. The matter is not confined to citizenship duties in any 
way. Indeed, there is a virtually universal consensus in the legal-philosophical 
literature that the moral duty to obey the law does not and cannot possibly exist.
87
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This has important implications for the views of those, who place the duty to obey the 
law at the core of citizenship. 
It is obvious that such a duty cannot be taken for a self-standing legal 
principle, since, to agree with Rawls, it would be highly artificial to imply that ‘when 
we find ourselves subject to an existing system of rules satisfying the definition of a 
legal system, we have an obligation to obey the law’.88 A number of arguments has 
been raised by thinkers throughout the centuries in favour of such a duty, based on 
different moral-philosophical considerations, but all of them gradually came to be 
dismissed.
89
 Indeed, to agree with Ladd, it seems like such externalist theories (i.e. 
presuming that the duty to obey the law comes from a non-legal source) are of little 
utility in justifying the obligation to obey the law.
90
 The same, however, holds for the 
internalist theories, which take the law as an intrinsically moral conception: it is not, 
to which innumerable examples of repugnant or unjust laws going against the 
common or individual good or making no sense at all, testify. This is why 
justifications of a requirement to obey the law, which are external to the legal system 
as such, tend to receive much more attention from legal philosophers. Although this is 
not a proper forum for a detailed analysis of all of those, a brief mentioning of them is 
relevant here, since should no general moral obligation to obey exist, any legal duty of 
citizenship is not distinguishable from a politicized act of coercion, which would be 
justified in some systems better than in others, while remaining, essentially, what it is: 
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an imposition unworthy of any glorification and entirely independent of the 
citizenship rights’ sphere. 
 In other words, an obligation vis-à-vis the State arises out of raw power, 
which it can deploy and does not have any decipherable moral component. Raw 
power is a result of political arrangements or, which is also possible, an act of abuse 
by the State. Missing the moral component, compliance does not make you a better or 
a worse citizen – either way is possible. Whether to be passive, active, or activist – in 
the sense of Isin’s theory – is a choice left entirely to each individual. It is crucial to 
realize in this context that the triumph of activist citizens, even if shifting the direction 
or the scope of state coercion, is unable to generate any moral obligation: the inherent 
immorality of the state remains unchanged. This being the case, and particularly given 
the origins of States
91
 and their frequently criminal nature,
92
 it is only logical that the 
line of the duties of citizenship has been shrinking gradually through time. 
Given all these observations, Lyons’ rhetorical question ‘why must we be 
asked to suppose that our moral obligations may routinely require us to be instruments 
of injustice’93 is of particular importance in the context of citizenship duties. In this 
context, arguments like we have duties since there is no choice anyway, are 
particularly fragile.
94
 Moreover, the fact that there is no strict separation between the 
law and morality, as has been underlined, inter alia, by Christie,
95
 does not really 
undermine the conclusion that there is no general duty to obey, since acceptance of 
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blatantly unjust and repugnant practices required by law as moral does not necessarily 
testify to their goodness. 
In this context all those attempting to present obedience as morally 
dignifying, even if they attempt to distance themselves from the feudal origins of the 
humbleness ideal, fail to convince. To give a couple of examples, let us look at Rawls 
and Walker. The Rawlsean view that the duty to obey the law is a necessary extension 
of the principle of fair play
96
 has been convincingly dismissed by a number of 
scholars.
97
 So Nagel has demonstrated that fair play in fact is reducible to pure 
utility.
98
 Moreover, not obeying the law is not necessarily free-riding,
99
 just as the 
acceptance of benefits does not necessarily bind one, producing duties. As presented 
by Nozick, ‘You may not decide to give me something, for example a book, and then 
grab money from me to pay for it, even if I have nothing better to spend the money 
on’.100 Also gratitude – popular among some philosophers as a reason to obey the law 
and the State
101
 – does not withstand criticism. While the key arguments are simple: 
good governments create benefits, and the receipt of the benefits is a reason to be 
grateful,
102
 numerous problems arise from them: it can be that the majority of 
governments are not actually good, moreover, many of them do not even govern,
103
 
benefits are not freely chosen, and, most importantly, the feeling of gratitude is not the 
same as a duty.  
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Moreover, States actually constantly limit citizens’ access to other States’ 
services, thus seriously harming their own citizens on numerous occasions, if not 
literally requiring them to die for the ideology of sovereign statehood and grateful 
community – what happens in all the states with sub-optimal health services which do 
not allow for the portability of health benefits. Davies provided excellent criticism of 
the current state of affairs,
104
 which nevertheless commands a lot of academic support 
by those who – absurdly – believe that the system in place is the best we can possibly 





IV. EU law and national citizenship duties 
The situation with citizenship duties is such, that there is a clearly decipherable trend 
of moving away from duties-inspired rhetoric and law, since the functions of 
uniformisation and discrimination that duties have been traditionally playing are of no 
use anymore for the modern democracies. The lack of a legal-philosophical ground 
for being serious about duties makes the arguments of those favouring a duty-based 
approach to citizenship even less appealing, particularly when not only the general 
duties-rights correlation, but also the moral duty to obey the law as such are not there. 
This is the context against which the empty word ‘duties’ in Article 20 TFEU is to be 
read. Moreover the Union actually reinforces the trends described above by indirectly 
obstructing the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce 
those, thus shielding some of their nationals from abuse. The Union clearly limits the 
possibility of the Member States to empower government authority vis-à-vis the 
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individual. In this respect, what Weiler called the ‘fundamental boundaries’ 106  is 
obviously affected by Union law. Weiler is absolutely right in stating that the balance 
between the ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘fundamental boundaries’ is at the core of any 
democracy and that joining the EU clearly narrows the ‘margin within which states 
may opt for different fundamental balances between government and individuals’107 
to a great extent. In fact, it means questioning the state on virtually any occasion – an 
additional guarantee against harmful or inexplicably regulation.
108
 
In this context, Joppke is absolutely justifiably ironical while critiquing 
Weiler’s view of citizenship eroded by rights109 and failing to act as a ‘shield against 
existential aloneness’.110 Reality has to be acknowledged and it is quite unequivocal: 
thick attachments, and with them the duties are largely gone in practice and would not 
be justifiable in theory either. Given that the same processes are going on at the 
supranational and the national level, there is no reason to believe that the Union where 
there are no citizenship duties and where rights and freedoms play the essential role as 
a starting point of legal thinking, should tolerate radically different ideologies in the 
Member States. To claim that the Member States should be free to do whatever they 
want with EU citizens who happen to be their nationals is legally unsound. The whole 
point of the Union is that our core values are shared after all.  
Being straight about the word ‘duties’ mentioned in the Treaty helps better 
understand the functioning of EU law vis-à-vis the citizens: Kymlicka is absolutely 
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right, claiming that in essence EU law is busy diffusing liberal nationhood.
111
 In the 
context of EU citizenship duties this means that by naturally opposing the totalitarian 
elements of the national conceptions of citizenship in the Member States, the EU also 
profoundly undermines their ability to have enforceable citizenship duties in place. 
Where such atavistic duties remain, EU law offers an easy escape, since its own 
fundamental freedoms always prevail. Classical case-law on requiring Member States 
to issue long-term residence permits to the Greek residents within their borders no 
matter what Greece thinks about these persons’ duty to serve in the Greek military is 
informative in this regard. If Greek law humiliates its citizens by refusing them 
passports unless they submit to the draft, the reaction of the ECJ requiring the 
issuance of residence permits without any Greek passports presented is only 
rational:
112
 liberty meets nationalism and prevails. By analogy, any time an EU 
fundamental freedom is in conflict with a local citizenship duty, the former is bound 
to prevail in the majority of cases. The decline in the Member States’ ability to 
impose the duties of citizenship is thus directly connected to the very essence of the 
EU’s constitutional arrangement, correlated with a necessary loss in the individual 
sovereign normative capacity.
113
 The EU allows for voting with one’s feet: those who 
dislike local citizenship duties are always free to go elsewhere. The EU thus functions 
as a promoter of the liberal de-dutification trend which is observable in the majority 
of contemporary democracies anyway. 
It is not surprising that the Member States might view such developments as 
problematic: opening up citizenship to competition is akin to allowing the sale of 
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 – thus removing another important feudal vestige – that happened in England, 
to give one example, less than a hundred years ago, which clearly threatened – and in 
the end was an important factor in changing
115
 – the social order of the day. Similarly, 
liberating citizens from non-refutable state claims to duties seriously changes the rules 
of the game. Instead of being coerced into performing actions deprived of any sense 
only because the State so wants,
116
 citizens are recognized as autonomous actors 
having the will of their own, of whom not only submission is required. When 
citizenship competition opens up, with national systems of citizenship losing, once 
and for all, their monopolistic status, this results in the creation of radically different 
bonds attachment between states and their populations, which is now based on choice, 
not only on the chance of birth. In the words of Davies, ‘Belgians are those who 
choose Belgium’.117 Competition between the Member States for the citizens who 
freely choose to call certain countries their home is thus the key element of the 
operation of the Internal Market that is valuable as a promoter of freedom.
118
 This 
kind of development is not contrary, but is in fact fully in line with a general trend in 
citizenship evolution described by Joppke, which co-accommodates increasing 
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Basing a legal system on rights, rather than duties, is not an arbitrary choice: it reflects 
the essential assumption that people should be free, which also includes freedom to 
determine the meaning of right and wrong, failure and success etc. in the context of 
the personal projects they pursue – a gift of freedom unthinkable in a system of pre-
existing prescriptions which necessarily underlie the concept of duties. Should 
citizenship be pared with freedom, there is no place for duties within the auspices of 
this concept. This is exactly what we observed in the context of citizenship’s 
evolution. There has never been any ‘shortage of sheep-like subjects’120 that the duty-
oriented vision of citizenship promotes. Yet, active engagement and the reshaping of 
the right and wrong in any given context, including a supranational Union, necessarily 
requires a rights-based approach to membership. 
 This article confined itself to making five interrelated points. 1.There are no 
empirically-observable duties of EU citizenship; 2.Such duties would lack any legal-
theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; 3.Legal-theoretical foundations of the 
duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; 4.EU law plays an 
important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties 
remain, to enforce them; 5.This development is part of a greater EU input into the 
strengthening of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the Member States, 
also reflecting an important general trend in law’s development. In the light of these 
findings it is unquestionable that there is no room for EU citizenship duties in the 
edifice of EU law. 
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